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Criminal infringement notices (CINs) are now a familiar component of the 
criminal justice system, especially in the policing of public order and minor 
offences. Successive Australian state and territory governments have implemented 
CIN schemes with the objective of reducing administrative demands and trial 
backlogs, cutting down on paperwork, freeing up police time, saving costs and 
keeping police ‘on the beat’. This article examines how CINs have been rationalised 
on the basis of neoliberal economic values, which have overshadowed ordinary 
criminal justice concerns of morality and responsibility. It focuses on the 
introduction of criminal code infringement notices in Western Australia for two 
offences: disorderly behaviour, and steal anything up to the value of $500. The 
author argues that there is a need to recognise—and to resist—the encroachment of 




I think the offenders would prefer to simply cop it sweet, pay a fine, not spend all 
that time in court and not attract a criminal record … Is it better for police? Is it 
better for the offender? I think it is. I think everybody is a winner here.1 
 
In Western Australia (WA), police may issue criminal code infringement 
notices (‘CCINs’) for two offences: disorderly behaviour, and steal anything up 
to the value of $500. Commencing in March 2015, the scheme enables police to 
issue infringement notices with a ‘modified penalty’ of $500 as an alternative to 
the person being charged or summonsed and appearing before a court. The 
WA Government promised that CCINs would yield a number of benefits, 
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including diverting alleged offenders away from the court system; allowing 
‘victims’ to have their cases remedied quickly; and enabling CCIN recipients to 
avoid a criminal record.2 
Several months after the scheme commenced, WA police issued a CCIN 
fine of $500 to a 20-year-old Indigenous woman for allegedly stealing a $6.75 
box of tampons at a Caltex service station in Coolgardie, a remote WA mining 
town. The fixed $500 fine amounted to 74 times the value of the stolen 
property. The woman’s ‘excuse’ given to police was that she had taken the 
tampons for another woman who had been ‘too ashamed’ to purchase them. 
Constable Evans accepted this to be ‘probably true’. 3  He nonetheless 
determined that issuing a CCIN was the appropriate course of action. 
Following the incident, Coolgardie Police tweeted about their decision to 
issue the $500 fine on Twitter. The decision to issue the CCIN and the 
crowdfunding campaign soon attracted international media attention. 
Essentials 4 Woman SA, an organisation for disadvantaged women, responded 
by launching a crowdfunding campaign to cover the $500 penalty. The 
campaign acknowledged that sanitary items can be prohibitively expensive for 
women who are financially disadvantaged.4 In just two days, the campaign had 
raised $3,456 over its goal of $500.5  
In many ways, this case study reflects central problems with CCINs that 
will be further explored in this article. Firstly, it demonstrates how fixed 
infringement fines may be disproportionate to, and fail to take into account, the 
recipient’s circumstances and level of culpability. Secondly, the WA 
Ombudsman has found that CCINs have had the starkest net-widening impact 
                                                
2 Ibid 8351b-8363a (Rob Johnson). 
3 Calla Wahlquist, ‘Aboriginal Woman in WA Fined $500 for Stealing $6.75 Box of Tampons’ The 
Guardian, 15 October 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/15/aboriginal-
woman-in-wa-fined-500-for-stealing-675-box-of-tampons>. 
4 Until recently, tampons, sanitary pads and liners (unlike condoms or lubricants) were considered to 
be ‘non-essential’ or ‘luxury’ items in Australia which attracted a 10% GST, raising approximately $38 
million a year in revenue: Alice Workman, ‘We Have The Receipts On How Much It Would Cost To 
Remove The Tampon Tax, And It Ain’t That Much’ BuzzFeed, 13 June 2017 
<https://www.buzzfeed.com/aliceworkman/tamponomics>; Josh Butler, ‘Senate Votes To Keep The 
GST On Tampons And Sanitary Pads’ Huffington Post, 19 June 2017 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/06/18/senate-votes-to-keep-the-gst-on-tampons-and-
sanitary-pads_a_22488719/>. 
5 The fine was paid on the woman’s behalf with the remainder (minus the crowd funding fees) given 
to the woman and donated to charity: Restoring Dignity for the Woman WA Police Fined $500 for 
Stealing Tampons! <https://ozcrowd.com/campaign/1035>; Saffron Howden, ‘Woman Fined for 
$6.75 Tampon Box Theft Donates Crowdfunded Money to Charity’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 
November 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/woman-fined-for-675-tampon-box-theft-
donates-crowdfunded-money-to-charity-20151103-gkpnfm.html>. 
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on Aboriginal females for alleged incidents of stealing. 6  Further, persons 
recorded as being of ‘Aboriginal appearance’7 accounted for 36% of CCIN 
recipients, despite Aboriginal Australians representing just 3.1% of the WA 
population. 8  Thirdly, the WA Ombudsman found a correlation between 
increased socio-economic disadvantage and an increased likelihood of receiving 
a CCIN.9 Finally, the ability to source crowdfunding highlights O’Malley’s 
critique of fines more generally as having ‘the amazing characteristic’ and 
‘striking peculiarity’ of ‘being virtually the only criminal penalty that legally can 
be borne by someone other than the offender’.10 
What is exceptional about this case, however, is that the officer’s tweet 
about the decision to issue the CCIN meant that in this instance, the police 
officer’s exercise of discretion did not go ‘under the radar’ but was exposed to 
public scrutiny. Ordinarily, there is no public account of the rationale and 
process for issuing infringement notices. This is because unlike a judicial 
officer, a police officer is under no obligation to give reasons for their decisions. 
Instead, CCINs are examples of ‘dividualised’ justice—highly ‘impersonal’ 
sanctions that can ‘be monitored, delivered and expiated privately and 
anonymously’.11  
When Constable Evans was asked whether the decision to issue the CCIN 
was an appropriate use of police discretion, he rationalised the decision in 
terms of efficiency: ‘prior to March, we would have to arrest her under 
suspicion, bring her back, do a recorded interview—it would have taken pretty 
much all day’.12 This statement is misleading. Police had—and continue to 
have—the discretion to caution a suspect for low-level offending. But what is 
most striking about Evans’ explanation is its lack of concern for the alleged 
offender’s criminal culpability. Instead, the decision to issue a CCIN was based 
                                                
6 WA Ombudsman, A Report on the Monitoring of the Infringement Notices Provisions of The 
Criminal Code, Final Report, WA Ombudsman, 2017) vol 3, 71 
<http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/Publications/Infringement-Notices.htm>. 
7 See n 67 for criticism of recording Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander identity in police statistics in 
this way.   




9 WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 3, 94-7. 
10 Pat O’Malley, The Currency of Justice: Fines and Damages in Consumer Societies (Routledge, 2009) 
4. 
11 Ibid 160–1. 
12 Wahlquist, above n 3. 
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on the notion of quick and efficient justice. The constable’s message was echoed 
by then WA Police Minister, Liza Harvey, who explained that CCINs provide 
‘swift justice, save court time and allow police to continue frontline duties’. 
Harvey added: ‘this Government doesn't apologise for handing out swift 
punishment of actual consequence’.13 
Both police and politicians adopted a neoliberal discourse of 
economisation to justify the implementation and use of CCINs in WA. Within 
this discourse, CCINs are justified in terms of increasing police productivity 
and flexibility; reducing administrative demands, paperwork and trial backlogs; 
freeing up police time; and saving costs. Routine police investigation and 
traditional court processes are commodified and depicted as unnecessary 
impediments to productivity; while justice is measured in hours and dollars 
rather than in terms of procedural fairness, the punishment fitting the crime 
and the application of the rule of law.   
This article examines the introduction and operation of CCINs in WA to 
demonstrate how criminal justice is being discursively reconstructed along 
neoliberal economic lines. This argument will be advanced via five parts. Part I 
outlines the methodology which informs the article. Part II examines key 
features of, and identifies problems associated with, criminal infringement 
notices (referred to generally as ‘CINs’, whereas the acronym ‘CCINs’ is used to 
refer specifically to the WA scheme). Part III examines key features of the 
CCIN scheme in WA and reflects on the WA Ombudsman’s 2017 report (‘the 
Ombudsman’s report’) on the scheme’s operation from the year commencing 5 
March 2015 (‘the monitoring period’).14 After addressing key concerns relating 
to the use of CCINS, Part IV highlights how CCINs have been represented, 
legitimised and evaluated in discourse with reference to second reading 
speeches and ministerial statements relating to CCINS, as well as the 
Ombudsman’s report. 
Part V summarises key findings and evaluates the implications of these for 
the application of administrative fines to criminal offending more generally. It 
argues that criminal justice discourse in relation to infringement notices has 
fostered and naturalised an ideology in which fiscal goals overshadow and 
supplant values traditionally associated with criminal law and punishment: 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 The Criminal Code (WA) s 723 provides that: ‘For the period of 12 months after the 
commencement of this section [4 March 2015], the Ombudsman is to keep under scrutiny the 
operation of the provisions of this Chapter and the regulations made under this Chapter’. 
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impartiality, fairness, moral culpability, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
retribution. The author ultimately takes an interventionist stance by 
denaturalising the market logic that has infused criminal justice discourse. 
Prior to advancing this argument, the following section details the methodology 




In 2001, Bourdieu and Wacquant noticed how, within a matter of a few years, a 
‘new planetary vulgate’ had entered the language of ‘employers, international 
officials, high-ranking civil servants, media intellectuals and high-flying 
journalists’. 15  This strange ‘Newspeak’ was replete with a vocabulary that 
seemed to ‘have sprung out of nowhere’, yet now flowed freely from everyone’s 
lips, with words including globalisation, flexibility, governance, employability, 
new economy and zero tolerance. 16  Alongside the emergence of this 
NewLiberalSpeak was the ‘conspicuous’ suppression of terms such as 
capitalism, class, exploitation, domination and inequality, such words having 
been ‘peremptorily dismissed under the pretext that they are obsolete and non-
pertinent’.17  
These buzzwords associated with the domain of free market capitalism are 
now far from peculiar. Neoliberal free market thinking and values have made 
considerable inroads into areas where it was once thought the market did not 
belong. The tide of the ‘Neoliberal project’18 rose in the early 1980s, a period in 
which US and UK leaders Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher maintained 
an unswerving commitment to free markets and private enterprise and 
alongside these, the dismantling of government institutions and social welfare. 
This neoliberal agenda was encapsulated in Reagan’s mantra: ‘Government is 
                                                
15 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, ‘NewLiberalSpeak: Notes on the New Planetary Vulgate’ 
(2001) 105 Radical Philosophy 2, 2. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Rick Matthews, ‘Marxist Criminology’ in Walter S DeKeseredy and Molly Dragiewicz (eds), 
Routledge handbook of critical criminology (Routledge, 2012) 93, 99; Neoliberalism is characterised 
by the ‘deregulation of business, the privatization of state enterprises and responsibilities, the 
dismantling of social programs, the expansion of market forces into new corners of society, a much-
weakened trade union movement, the return of unrestrained competition, and the rebirth of 
previously rejected free-market economic theories’: Terrence McDonough, Michael Reich and David 
M Kotz, Contemporary Capitalism and Its Crises: Social Structure of Accumulation Theory for the 
21st Century (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 9. 
70 University of Western Australia Law Review Vol 45(2): 65 
 
the problem’.19 Adherents to neoliberal economic ideologies professed free, 
deregulated markets to be the primary means for achieving the public good. 
From the 1980s onwards, the market expanded into and ‘colonised’20 parts of 
the public realm.21 As a result of this colonisation, we now have for-profit 
schools and hospitals; ‘entrepreneurial universities’ 22 —restructured and 
rebranded around the goals of increased outputs, competitiveness, customer-
orientation, student employability, market relevance and private partnerships; 
and privatised prisons, where private companies are building prisons, providing 
food and medical care and are also involved in their day-to-day management, 
transforming this once government institution into a for-profit business.23 As 
Sandel has observed: ‘The reach of markets, and market-oriented thinking, into 
aspects of life traditionally governed by nonmarket norms is one of the most 
significant developments of our time’.24  
The concepts associated with neoliberal economics and its jargon are 
reengineering all aspects of social, economic and cultural life, including 
criminal law and procedure. CINs are but one example of new measures 
implemented in the criminal justice system on the rationale of increasing 
efficiency and productivity while reducing expenditure. Another recent 
initiative is the New South Wales (NSW) Government’s ‘tough and smart 
justice’ sentencing reforms. Introduced in 2017, the reforms encompass 
measures such as fixed sentencing discounts for the utilitarian value of early 
guilty pleas, regulating the early disclosure of evidence including the ability to 
serve briefs of evidence in inadmissible form, mandatory case conferencing 
between parties and the replacement of committal hearings presided over by a 
magistrate with senior prosecutors who ‘screen out’ cases through charge 
                                                
19 Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Penguin, 2012) 6; Anthony 
S Campagna, The Economy in the Reagan Years: The Economic Consequences of the Reagan 
Administrations (Greenwood, 1994) 123. 
20 Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis and the Marketization of Public Discourse: The 
Universities’ (1993) 4(2) Discourse and Society 133. 
21 Christopher Hart, Piotr Cap and Gerlinde Mautner (eds), ‘The Privatization of the Public Realm: A 
Critical Perspective on Practice and Discourse’ in Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies 
(Bloomsbury, 2014) 461. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Paul Leighton and Donna Selman, ‘Private Prisons, the Criminal Justice–Industrial Complex and 
Bodies Destined for Profitable Punishment’ in Walter S. DeKeseredy and Molly Dragiewicz (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of Critical Criminology (Routledge, 2012) 265. Also of note are for-profit 
schools and hospitals. 
24 Sandel, above n 19, 7. 
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certification.25 Similar to CINs, these reforms replace judicial processes with 
‘technocratic’ 26  and administrative ones, reduce judicial discretion and 
oversight within the criminal justice process, and represent a significant 
departure from the traditional adversarial system. And like CINs, these reforms 
were sold to the public using utilitarian, neoliberal reasoning, in terms of their 
ability to ‘deliver swifter, more certain justice’ and to ‘reduce time and money 
wasted on police, courts and lawyers’.27  
With this socio-political context in mind, this research identifies—and 
argues against—free market and economic logic as a rationale for 
implementing on-the-spot fines for criminal offending. In doing so, the article 
builds on O’Malley’s analysis of fines as melded into, and symptomatic of, 
consumer societies.28 In 2009, O'Malley postulated that: ‘The persistence and 
expansion of regulatory fines in the "post-social era", the era of consumer-led 
market liberalism, perhaps is due not to their "technical" nature alone, but also 
to their conformity with neoliberal political ideals’.29 The author advances 
O’Malley’s suggestion by demonstrating how CINs have been rationalised using 
neoliberal economic ideals of increasing efficiency and productivity, while 
cutting expenditure, paperwork and 'red tape'. These neoliberal ideals have 
crowded out criminal sentencing concerns which prioritise the proportionate 
punishment of an offender in a fashion which reflects the objective seriousness 
of the offence and their individual culpability. 
The analysis is distinguished from O'Malley's in that its focus is not on 
money’s peculiar characteristics as a legal sanction. 30  Instead, this article 
examines how CINs—a quasi-administrative, quasi-criminal sanction—have 
been legitimised using neoliberal economic reasoning. Criminal law scholars 
have largely overlooked how neoliberal economic principles have become the 
central justification for applying administrative fines to criminal offences.31 
                                                
25 See Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals and Guilty Pleas) Bill 2017 (NSW) and Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Sentencing Options) Bill 2017 (NSW).  
26 Pat O’Malley, ‘Technocratic Justice in Australia’ (1984) 2 Law in Context: A Socio-Legal Journal 31. 
27 Community Relations Division and NSW Department of Justice, Early Guilty Pleas 
<http://www.justice.nsw.gov.au:80/Pages/Reforms/early-guilty-pleas.aspx>. 
28 O’Malley, above n 10. 
29 Ibid 169; see also Pat O’Malley, ‘Simulated Justice: Risk, Money and Telemetric Policing’ (2010) 
50(5) British Journal of Criminology 795. 
30 See also Julia Quilter and Russell Hogg, ‘The Hidden Punitiveness of Fines’ (2018) 7(3) 
International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 9. 
31 However, see Melinda Cooper, Money as Punishment: Neoliberal Budgetary Politics and the Fine, 
2017, where the issue of administrative fines and neoliberalism is critiqued from a sociological 
perspective < 
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Further, previous studies have failed to account for the role of discourse in 
fashioning a view of CINs as an appropriate and necessary solution to the 
asserted problem of administrative inefficiency in the justice system. This 
article fills these gaps in the literature by arguing that, with the advent of 
administrative fines for criminal offending, there has been a marked discursive 
shift in how criminal justice is conceived of and rationalised. The article 
evaluates the legitimacy of CINs from the premise that a critical analysis of 
discourse illuminates the various ways in which neoliberal economic ideologies 
have infiltrated the criminal justice system and transformed its values. Criminal 
‘justice’ is being discursively reconstructed along neoliberal economic lines.32  
Drawing on the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (‘CDA’),33 
discourse is viewed as the primary unit of communication and defined as 
‘socially constructed ways of knowing some aspect of reality’.34 The author 
analyses the limited set of written texts publicly available in relation to the 
operation of and justifications provided for CCINs to show how discourse plays 
a fundamental role in ‘making the socio-economic transformations of new 
capitalism and policies of governments to facilitate them seem inevitable; 
representing desires as facts; and representing the imaginaries of interested 
policies—the interested possible realities they project—as the way that the 
world actually is’.35 Simply put, a neoliberal discourse of economisation has 
reshaped practices within the criminal justice system, so much so that this 
commodification of justice is now accepted as obvious, logical and inevitable. A 
key principle of CDA is that discourse is both socially constituted and 
constitutive:36 discourse plays a key role in structuring conduct, but it is also 
shaped by social conduct.37 As the study is situated within the realm of criminal 
justice, the term criminal justice discourse is employed to describe how 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.academia.edu/34333175/Money_as_Punishment_Neoliberal_Budgetary_Politics_and_th
e_Fine >. 
32 O’Malley, above n 10. 
33 Fairclough provides the example of how the ‘language of management has colonised public 
institutions and organisations such as universities’: Norman Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ 
in James Paul Gee and Michael Handford (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis 
(Routledge, 2013) 9, 283. 
34 Theo van Leeuwen, ‘Discourse as the Recontextualization of Social Practice: A Guide’ in Ruth 
Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds), Methods of critical discourse analysis (Sage, 2009) 144, 144. 
35 Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, above n 33, 282. 
36 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Polity Press, 1992) 64. 
37 Gerlinde Mautner, ‘The Entrepreneurial University: A Discursive Profile of a Higher Education 
Buzzword’ (2005) 2(2) Critical Discourse Studies 95, 100. 
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‘primary definers’38 in criminal justice debates linguistically construct reality, 
with a focus on politicians, police and policy-review agencies such as the 
Ombudsman.39 It pays particular regard to political discourse—the linguistic 
strategies used by political actors to mobilise support for CCINs.  
Due to practical constraints, the study’s focus is on the jurisdiction of WA, 
but uses as a point of comparison the operation of CINs in NSW. The texts 
selected for analysis detail the State’s justification for the implementation of, 
evaluate the operation of and rationalise CCINs, including second reading 
speeches and parliamentary debates in relation to the CCIN scheme; ministerial 
press releases and statements made to media; and the WA Ombudsman’s 
report which evaluated the operation of CCINs in their first year of operation. 
Further, the texts were selected due to their public availability: police need not 
give or publish reasons for issuing CCINs and the WA Police policy in relation 
to CCINs is, at the time of writing, not publicly available. 
Through this selection of texts, the study examines ‘not only the entry of 
discourses into new domains, but the diverse ways in which they are received, 
appropriated, and recontextualised’. 40  Having detailed the methodology 
informing the analysis of CCINs, the following Part traces the rise of 
infringement notices in criminal law and reviews the literature regarding their 
use.   
 
II CRIMINAL INFRINGEMENT NOTICES  
 
Criminal infringement notices (CINs, also referred to as CCINs in WA, 
expiation notices in SA, and more generally, penalty notices or on-the-spot 
fines)41 are notices to the effect that if the person served does not elect to have 
the matter determined by a court (court-elect), they must pay the amount 
prescribed for the offence within a fixed time period. A once unconventional 
sanction limited to traffic and parking breaches, CINs are now a familiar 
component of the criminal justice system, especially in the policing of public 
order and minor offences.  
                                                
38 Russell Hogg and David Brown, Rethinking Law and Order (Pluto Press, 1998) 18–19. 
39 See Elyse Methven, Dirty Talk: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Offensive Language Crimes 
(University of Technology Sydney, 2017). 
40 Fairclough, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, above n 33, 283. 
41 While often referred to as ‘on the spot’, the fine itself is never exacted in the initial police-citizen 
interaction: Richard Fox, ‘On Punishing Infringements Sentencing: Some Key Issues: Chapter II’ 
(1995) 13 Law in Context: A Socio-Legal Journal 7, 9. 
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A The Rise of CINs as a Criminal Justice Measure 
 
The creep of administrative fines into criminal law was overlooked by 
mainstream criminal law scholarship until Fox’s analysis of administrative fines 
in 1995.42 Fox then warned: ‘To date, the offences which can be handled by way 
of an on-the-spot fine have not strayed sufficiently into the domain of 'real 
crime' to be regarded as posing a threat to civil liberties, but the potential is 
there.’43 In the decades since that prediction, successive state and territory 
governments across Australia have touted CINs as the obvious solution to 
reducing court delays, increasing police productivity, saving money and even 
turning a profit.  
All Australian states and territories now have CINs as an alternative to a 
criminal charge or summons for nominated offences.44 For example in NSW, 
CINs currently apply to the crimes of larceny of property up to the value of 
$300, being unlawfully in possession of property, offensive behaviour, offensive 
language, unauthorised entry of vehicles, and drunk and disorderly behaviour 
following a move-on notice.45 In Queensland, infringement notices are available 
for the crimes of solicitation for the purposes of prostitution;46 certain drug 
offences; 47  public nuisance (including obscene or offensive language and 
                                                
42 Ibid; Richard Fox, Criminal Justice on the Spot: Infringement Penalties in Victoria (Australian 
Institute of Criminology Canberra, 1995); Richard Fox, ‘Infringement Notices: Time for Reform?’ 
(51, Australian Institute of Criminology, 1995). 
43 Fox, above n 41, 19. 
44 Criminal Procedure Regulation 2017 (NSW) sch 4; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 333-40; 
Summary Offences Regulations 1994 (NT) regs 3-4A; State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld) ss 
13-15, 27-3; State Penalties Enforcement Regulation 2014 (Qld) sch 1; Expiation of Offences Act 1996 
(SA); Expiation of Offences Regulations 2011 (SA); Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 61; Monetary 
Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) s 14; Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic) ss 60AA and 60AB(2); 
Criminal Code (WA) ss 720-3; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) pt 2; Criminal Code 
(Infringement Notices) Regulation 2015 (WA) sch 1. For discussion of the use of penalty notices for 
offensive language in NSW see: Elyse Methven, ‘Should Penalty Notices Be Issued for Using Offensive 
Language?’ (2012) 37 Alternative Law Journal 63; Elyse Methven, ‘A Very Expensive Lesson: 
Counting the Costs of Penalty Notices for Anti-Social Behaviour’ (2014) 26 Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 249. 
45 Criminal Procedure Regulation 2017 (NSW) sch 4; Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 9(1) 
provides that ‘A person who: (a) is given a move on direction for being intoxicated and disorderly in a 
public place, and (b) at any time within 6 hours after the move on direction is given, is intoxicated 
and disorderly in the same or another public place, is guilty of an offence’. 
46 Prostitution Act 1999 (Qld) s 73(1)(a), where it is a first offence. 
47 For example, Drug Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) s 10(2): unlawful possession of thing used in connection 
with the administration, consumption or smoking of a dangerous drug. 
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disorderly, threatening or offensive behaviour), public urination, begging, wilful 
exposure, trespass, and tattooing or selling spray paint to a minor.48 
 
B Common Features of CINs 
 
CINs impose a uniform penalty regardless of the culpability of the offender or 
their ability to pay the fine. This means that the punishment imposed may be 
unduly lenient or unduly harsh. Despite the NSW Law Reform Commission’s 
recommendation in 2012 that, except in ‘exceptional’ circumstances, penalty 
notice amounts should not exceed 25% of the maximum court fine for an 
offence, the fixed penalty notice amounts for a number of NSW offences range 
from 66-75% of the maximum court-imposed fines. For instance, the CIN 
amounts for offensive language and offensive conduct in NSW are $500, 
whereas the maximum fine a court can impose is $660.49 The CIN amount for 
the continuation of intoxicated and disorderly behaviour following a move on 
direction is a sizeable $1100, while a court can impose a maximum fine of 
$1650. These fixed fine amounts are ‘impossible to pay’50 for many recipients, 
an issue that is examined below.  
CINs are administrative rather than judicial in nature; the question of 
whether the recipient has committed an infringement offence is determined by 
a police officer (part of the executive branch of government), not adjudicated 
by a court (part of the judicial branch of government), and a police officer’s 
findings in this regard do not carry the weight of a judicial officer’s findings of 
criminal liability. The WA Police Force’s webpage substantiates this when it 
states: ‘Paying an infringement is not regarded as an admission for the purposes 
of any civil or criminal court case, and does not have to be declared on your 
                                                
48 State Penalties Enforcement Regulation 2014 (Qld) sch 1. 
49 For offensive conduct, a court can also impose up to three months’ imprisonment, and there are 
also a range of other sentencing options available: Elyse Methven, above n 44; the NSWLRC has 
recommended that only in ‘exceptional circumstances involving demonstrated public interest may a 
penalty notice amount be up to 50% of the maximum court fine, for example where (i) the harm 
caused by the offence is likely to be particularly severe, (ii) there is a need to provide effective 
deterrence because the offender stands to make a profit from the activity, or (iii) the great majority of 
offences are dealt with by way of penalty notices, so that the maximum court penalty is less significant 
as a comparator’. These exceptional circumstances currently do not exist for the crimes of offensive 
language or conduct in NSW: NSW Law Reform Commission, Penalty Notices, Final Report, (2012) 
108. 
50 Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice–An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Report No 133 (2018) [12.182] 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/indigenous-incarceration-report133>. 
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criminal history.’51 Because no determination of criminal guilt has been made, 
CIN recipients are neither ‘offenders’ nor ‘criminals’, although they are 
regularly misrepresented as such in criminal justice discourse.52 The regular 
misuse of the label ‘criminal’ to refer to a person receiving a CIN, as well the 
association of CINs with criminal liability, demonstrates that despite being 
‘administrative’ fines, the stigma associated with criminality attaches to those 
who receive a CIN.  
As CINs are—or purport to be—administrative sanctions, police may use 
these fines to circumvent the protections and principles ordinarily attached to 
criminal prosecution, which aim to guard against arbitrary and unjust 
punishment. A CIN need not, and ordinarily does not, detail the facts 
constituting the charge; police need only specify the relevant criminal offence 
that has allegedly been committed on the notice.53 Accordingly, CIN recipients 
considering whether or not to challenge the CIN through internal police 
processes or in court will not have available to them the details of the case 
against them (presumably, they may be apprised of these details once a request 
has been made to the police for such information).   
Unless and until a CIN recipient decides to court-elect, the presumption of 
innocence does not apply. CINs reverse the onus and burden of proof, given 
that the State need not prove the elements of the offence, nor disprove any 
defences raised, to the standard of beyond reasonable doubt.54 Given that CIN 
fines are punitive in effect (especially considering the serious fines-enforcement 
consequences attached to non-payment); carry the stigma of being criminal; 
and that police retain the threat of criminal charge until a fine has been paid in 
full, CINs belong in the ‘foggy grey zone’ between criminal and administrative 
                                                
51 Western Australia Police, Criminal Code Infringements (19 September 2016) Western Australia 
Police <https://www.police.wa.gov.au/Police-Direct/Infringement-Payments-and-
Enquiries/Criminal-Code-Infringements>. 
52 See, eg, Western Australia Police, Criminal Code Infringement FAQs Western Australia Police 
<https://www.police.wa.gov.au/Police-Direct/Infringement-Payments-and-Enquiries/Criminal-Code-
Infringements/Criminal-Code-Infringement-FAQs> which states that: ‘A CCIN is a Criminal Code 
Infringement Notice that will be issued to offenders for nominated minor criminal offences’; cf the 
Criminal Code (WA) s 722, which uses the wording of ‘alleged offender’ and ‘alleged offence’. 
53 Under Article 14.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, (entered into force 23 March 1976), a person must be ‘informed 
promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge 
against him’.  
54 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; see also Article 14.2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights ibid. 
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law, branded ‘criministrative’ law. 55  The fourth Part of this article will 
demonstrate the role of discourse in blurring these boundaries and displacing 
concerns about procedural safeguards and transparent justice, replacing these 
with market-related objectives of efficiency and productivity.  
Recipients of CINs are encouraged to accept and pay their fines—or at the 
very least not appeal them—via a number of built-in ‘incentives’.56 Then WA 
Police Minister Rob Johnson recognised this when he stated that ‘offenders 
would prefer to simply cop it sweet, pay a fine, not spend all that time in court 
and not attract a criminal record’.57 As Johnson stated, by ‘copping the fine’, 
CIN recipients: avoid a judicial finding of criminal guilt and a criminal record; 
to some extent elude the stigma attached to a finding of guilt; save any time and 
expenses associated with court proceedings; and avoid the possibility that a 
court could impose a larger fine and, for some offences, a sentence of 
imprisonment.58 A CIN recipient who believes that they are innocent of the 
alleged offence may nonetheless feel compelled to pay the fine to avoid the 
possibility of criminal punishment. This threat can be phrased coercively; for 
instance, the WA Police Force website warns: ‘If you do not want to be 
prosecuted in court for the alleged offence, pay the Amount Due by the Due 
Date.’59 Although this statement represents criminal prosecution as inevitable 
upon non-payment,60 in practice, the consequence of non-payment by the due 
date is unlikely to result in the initiation of court proceedings, but in a Final 
Demand notice being issued.61 That police nonetheless retain the threat of 
criminal prosecution until a fine is paid shows one way in which CINs amplify 
                                                
55 Anne Weyembergh and Nicolas Joncheray, ‘Punitive Administrative Sanctions and Procedural 
Safeguards: A Blurred Picture That Needs to Be Addressed’ (2016) 7(2) New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 190, 190. 
56 Fox, above n 41, 9. 
57 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 9 November 2010, 8351b-8363a 
(Rob Johnson). 
58 For example, the crime of offensive conduct, contrary to the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 
4, currently carries a penalty of $660 or imprisonment for three months, in comparison to a fixed 
CIN amount of $500. 
59 Western Australia Police, above n 52. 
60 For discussion of representations of causality in discourse, see Norman Fairclough, Language and 
Power (Longman, 1989) 51; see also Elyse Methven, ‘A Little Respect: Swearing, Police and Criminal 
Justice Discourse’ (2018) 7(3) International Journal of Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 58. 
61 WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 1, 16-17. If payment is not made in the 28 day time period 
specified in the Final Demand Notice, further fine enforcement measurements may be ordered after 
the fine is registered with the Fines Enforcement Registry: Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices 
Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) ss 14-21A. 
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police power, by adding to the range of coercive tools at a police officer’s 
disposal to control public behaviour.  
Fox not only foreshadowed the likelihood that CINs would stray into other 
areas of the criminal law; he also foreshadowed their net-widening capacity,62 in 
other words, the likelihood that CINs will result in the criminal justice system 
‘scooping into its net a larger group of citizens than might otherwise have been 
the case.’63 Fox attributed the phenomenon of net-widening predominantly to 
the ‘ease with which infringement notices can be issued’—police may choose to 
issue a CIN rather than ignore, caution or warn the alleged offender.64 These 
contentions have since been, in some respects, validated by statistics collated in 
NSW and WA. For example, as detailed below, the WA Ombudsman found the 
net-widening effect of CCINs to be most striking for Aboriginal females having 
actions taken against them for alleged incidents of stealing. 
 
C Impact of CINs on Disadvantaged People and Indigenous Australians 
 
The literature demonstrates that CINs are disproportionately issued to 
Indigenous Australians and operate especially harshly against those who 
cannot, or will not, pay their fines.65 In the year ending 31 March 2017, 
Indigenous Australians comprised 476 (11%) of the 4386 adults who received a 
CIN for offensive language or behaviour in NSW, despite Indigenous 
Australians representing only 3% of the NSW population.66 The numbers in 
WA are even more troubling. Of the 1800 CCINs issued in the year ending 4 
March 2016 for the crime of disorderly behaviour (which includes offensive 
language and behaviour), 752 (42%) were issued to recipients whose ‘offender 
appearance’ was recorded as Aboriginal. Of the total 2978 CCINs issued in that 
                                                
62 ‘Net-widening’ refers to the phenomenon where people receive a CIN in circumstances where they 
would have otherwise had their conduct ignored, received a warning, a caution or had the proceeding 
dismissed in Court. 
63 Fox, above n 41, 10. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Gaye Lansdell et al, ‘Infringement Systems in Australia: A Precarious Blurring of Civil and Criminal 
Sanctions?’ (2012) 37(1) Alternative Law Journal 41; NSW Ombudsman, ‘Review of the Impact of 
Criminal Infringement Notices on Aboriginal Communities’ (Legislative Report, New South Wales 
Ombudsman, 1 August 2009) 
<https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/3407/FR_CINs_ATSI_review_Aug09.pd
f >. 
66 Statistics obtained by researcher in 2017: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, ‘Persons of 
Interest (POIs) Proceeded against by the NSW Police Force for Offensive Language or Conduct 
Offences’. 
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period, 1080 (36%) were issued to recipients whose ‘offender appearance’ was 
Aboriginal. 67  This percentage more or less reflects that of the prisoner 
population in WA: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians comprised 
38% of the WA prison population as at 30 June 2016.68 By way of contrast, the 
WA Indigenous population was recorded at 3.1% of the WA population in 
2016.69  
The WA Ombudsman found a correlation between increased 
vulnerability and socio-economic disadvantage, and an increased likelihood of 
receiving a CCIN.70 Further, vulnerable CIN recipients, many of whom are also 
Indigenous Australians, often do not and cannot pay their fines on time, if at 
all. This leads to fines, the initial amount of which is already prohibitive, 
spiralling into insurmountable debt. 71  The NSW Ombudsman in 2009 
documented that nine out of every 10 Indigenous Australians issued with a 
CIN failed to pay within the time allowed.72 The WA Ombudsman also found a 
correlation between increased socio-economic disadvantage and a decreased 
likelihood of paying one’s fine on time.73 In addition, the Ombudsman found a 
low payment rate for CCINs generally: only 21% of all CCIN recipients had 
paid their CCINs in full as at 22 April 2016.74 For Aboriginal recipients, only 
3% had paid their CCIN for disorderly behaviour and just 1% had paid their 
CCIN for stealing.  
The fact that Indigenous Australians are more likely to receive 
infringement notices for public order and other minor offences is a result of 
                                                
67 The WA Police determine and record ‘offender appearance’ from three categories: Aboriginal, 
Caucasian and Other. There is no category for Torres Strait Islander People given the very small 
percentage of Torres Strait Islanders in WA: Only 0.06 per cent of the Western Australian population 
identified as Torres Strait Islander people in the 2016 Census and a further 0.07 per cent identified as 
both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. Note that criticisms can be levelled at WA Police for 
identifying the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander identity of a person by means of ‘offender 
appearance’. The standards for collecting and recording Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander status 
should instead be derived from the identification of a person as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, 
including by descent, self-identification, and acceptance of the person as an Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander by their community: WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 1, 35-6; vol 4, 7. 
68 Ibid 35. 
69 Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 8. 
70 WA Ombudsman, above n 6, 34, 46. 
71 Bernadette Saunders et al, ‘An Examination of the Impact of Unpaid Infringement Notices on 
Disadvantaged Groups and the Criminal Justice System - Towards a Best Practice 
Model’<http://youthlaw.asn.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CJRC-Examination-Web-Copy.pdf>. 
72 NSW Ombudsman, above n 65. 
73 WA Ombudsman, above n 6, 20. Advantage was measured using suburbs and addresses provided to 
WA Police and the Australian Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage. 
74 Ibid 18. Seventeen per cent of the total (2,978) had been paid after the initial notice was issued, and 
4 per cent after a final demand notice was issued. 
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multiple and complex factors. Firstly, many Indigenous Australians are more 
likely to conduct everyday activities, including ‘private’ activities and disputes, 
in public space than non-Indigenous Australians.75 This is primarily due to 
socio-cultural factors and Indigenous Australians’ unique connection to the 
land. People who are homeless or living in temporary accommodation are also 
often forced to conduct their private lives, including personal disputes, in 
public spaces.76 There is also a greater proportion of physical disability, mental 
illness, alcohol or drug-dependency, and a history of family and domestic 
violence among these groups. 77  Factors of disadvantage prevalent within 
Indigenous communities cannot be divorced from the intergenerational effects 
of colonisation and government policies which resulted in dispossession, 
disenfranchisement and the Stolen Generations.78  
 
D Fines Enforcement Sanctions 
 
Every Australian state and territory has progressive, often punitive, sanction 
regimes for fine default. If CIN fines are not paid on time, people may 
accumulate further debts, have their driver’s licence suspended or disqualified, 
have property seized, their vehicle immobilised or may be ordered to perform 
community service work. In WA, the CCIN recipient’s details may also be 
published on a website.79  
Driver licence sanctions operate especially harshly on Aboriginal people 
living in regional, rural or remote communities, where private vehicles can be 
the only practical means of transport available to access work or basic services, 
such as health care.80 In some circumstances, such as where a person is unable 
to comply with a community service order, fine default may lead to 
imprisonment.81 Sentences of imprisonment may also be imposed as a result of 
                                                
75 Tamara Walsh, ‘Who Is “Public” in a “Public Space”?’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law Journal 81; Jarrod 
White, ‘Power/Knowledge and Public Space: Policing the “Aboriginal Towns”’ (1997) 30 The 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 275. 
76 Tamara Walsh, ‘Poverty, Police and the Offence of Public Nuisance’ (2008) 20 Bond Law Review 7. 
77 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 50. 
78 Thalia Anthony, Indigenous People, Crime and Punishment (Routledge, 2013). 
79 WA Ombudsman, ‘Monitoring of the Infringement Notices Provisions of The Criminal Code’ 
(Consultation Paper, WA Ombudsman, 8 April 2016) 
<http://www.ombudsman.wa.gov.au/CCINs/Documents/Monitoring_infringement_notices_provisio
ns_Criminal_Code_Consultation_Paper.pdf>. 
80 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 50. 
81 Ibid ch 12; Mary Spiers Williams and Robyn Gilbert, Reducing the Unintended Impact of Fines 
(Indigenous Justice Clearinghouse, 2011); Elyse Methven, ‘We Need Evidence-Based Law Reform to 
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secondary offending from fines enforcement actions, such as driving whilst 
unlicensed due to driver licence disqualification.82 The Kimberley Community 
Legal Services has suggested that for many Indigenous people, those who are 
homeless and other groups experiencing disadvantage, the imposition of a $500 
fixed fine for swearing is ‘tantamount to a prison sentence’.83 The Australian 
Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) recommended in a 2018 report that 
governments work with relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
organisations to develop options to reduce the imposition of infringement 
notices, limit penalty amounts, avoid suspension of drivers’ licences for fine 
default and provide alternative ways of paying infringement notices.84 
This article has so far examined key features of CIN regimes, and discussed 
related issues such as net-widening, arbitrariness, and entrenching socio-
economic and Indigenous disadvantage. The following Part scrutinises the WA 
CCIN regime in detail, before addressing the role of criminal justice discourse 
in legitimising CCINs and overshadowing concerns raised thus far in relation 
to their operation.   
 
IV CRIMINAL CODE INFRINGEMENT NOTICES 
 
CCINs commenced operation in a pilot scheme across selected WA suburbs on 
30 March 2015, and were rolled out across the state on 3 August 2015.85 The 
scheme was modelled on the CIN scheme operating in NSW since 2008,86 a key 
difference being that in NSW a recipient must be 18 years or older, whereas in 
WA the recipient need only have attained the age of 17 years.87 As at the time of 
writing, CCINs apply to two prescribed offences: disorderly behaviour in public 
                                                                                                                           
Reduce Rates of Indigenous Incarceration’ The Conversation (online), 9 April 2018 
<http://theconversation.com/we-need-evidence-based-law-reform-to-reduce-rates-of-indigenous-
incarceration-94228>. 
82 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 50; Methven, above n 81. 
83 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 50, [12.182]. 
84 Ibid, Recommendation 12-2. 
85 See WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 1, 13 for a list of the pilot suburbs. 
86 The CIN regime was introduced firstly in a trial in 2002, when legislation was passed to authorise a 
12-month trial period for CINs for certain prescribed offences, including common assault, larceny or 
shoplifting, offensive language, offensive conduct, obtaining money by wilful false representation, 
obstructing traffic, and unauthorised entry of vehicle or boat. This list was subsequently amended 
with some offences being added and others - such as common assault - removed. The scheme was 
implemented state-wide in 2008: NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 49, 6; Western Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 February 2011. 
87 Criminal Code (Infringement Notices) Regulations 2015 (WA) reg 5. 
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or a police lock-up (‘disorderly behaviour’),88 and steal anything capable of 
being stolen to the value of $500.89 
 
A Issuing a CCIN 
 
Although colloquially referred to as on-the-spot fines, WA police do not 
actually serve infringement notices on-the-spot; currently, police must first 
return to the police station, enter the details of the CCIN into the NTIMS (the 
Non-Traffic Infringement Management Solution) system,90 and following this, 
post the notice to, or serve it personally on, the recipient.91 As evident in the 
example below, a CCIN specifies the offence which the recipient is alleged to 
have committed (for instance, ‘behaving in a disorderly manner’), but does not 
stipulate further details of the conduct constituting the alleged offence (for 
instance, whether it was offensive language or insulting language), nor the 
officer’s reasons for issuing the CCIN. 
When a CCIN is issued, the suspect is taken to be ‘charged’ for the 
purposes of the Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA) 
(although for other purposes, the suspect has not been charged with a crime). 
This allows police to take and retain identity information such as fingerprints, 
photographs and the person’s measurements on a forensic database.92 Police 
need only destroy the identity information once requested to do so. The WA 
Ombudsman found that of the 2978 CCINs issued to 2817 individuals during 
the 12-month monitoring period, WA police obtained identifying particulars 
                                                
88 Criminal Code (WA) s 74A(2). 
89 The enabling Act, the Criminal Code Amendment (Infringement Notices) Act 2011 (WA), was 
introduced in 2011, however it took four years for the WA Parliament to introduce CCINS under this 
Act by introducing the Criminal Code (Infringement Notices) Regulations 2015 (WA); s 378 
Criminal Code (WA). 
90 The Non-Traffic Infringement Management Solution (NTIMS) system is a computerised system 
developed by WA police to manage the use of CCINs. The development of this system was a key 
reason why it took WA approximately four years to implement the CCIN scheme from the date of the 
introduction of the legislation into Parliament. It is now also being used for other non-traffic 
infringements, such as infringements related to firearms: WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 2, 21. 
91 Ibid vol 1, 16. 
92 Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA) s 47. Note that for stealing, if 
considered a serious offence (as the statute contains a penalty of 12 months or more: s 3), the police 
may also retain other identity information such as dental imprints and the person’s DNA profile.  If 
the person does not consent or withdraws consent to the identifying procedure pursuant to s 49 of the 
Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA) the suspect may be arrested; and the 
procedure may be done on the suspect against the suspect’s will.  The identity information may be 
compared with other police information (whether or not this information is in the database) and 
could be used in any court proceedings. 
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from 530 (19% of) recipients. Extrapolating from statistics of state-wide data,93 
the Ombudsman estimated that none of the individuals who had paid off their 
fine had requested the destruction of their identity information. 
 
Image I: example of a CCIN.94 
 
B Consequences of Non-Payment and Fine Enforcement Measures 
 
If a CCIN recipient fails to pay the prescribed amount within 28 days, the 
person receives a Final Demand Notice. Police also retain the discretion to 
prosecute the person in court for the alleged offence. If, following the additional 
28-day period, the recipient fails to pay the amount specified on the Final 
Demand Notice, the infringement may be registered at the WA Fines 
Enforcement Registry and the infringement is made an order of the court. The 
                                                
93 State-wide, requests for destruction of identity information are made in only 0.02% of instances. 
94 Western Australia Police, above n 52. 
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recipient may then either pay the fine and added costs within a further 28 days, 
or elect to have the matter referred to a magistrate. If full payment is still not 
received within the specified time, enforcement action can include the CCIN 
recipient’s driver’s license being suspended or their details published on a 
website. Alternatively, an enforcement warrant may authorise the Sheriff to 
immobilise the recipient’s vehicle and/or seize and sell their property to satisfy 
the debt.95   
 
C Offences Subject to CCINs 
 
As described above, the CCIN regime currently applies to two offences in the 
WA Criminal Code: disorderly behaviour and steal anything up to the value of 
$500. Each CCIN offence attracts a modified penalty of $500. These two 
offences were selected due to ‘the volume of people committing these offences’ 
and their ‘low-level nature’.96 It is anticipated that the regime will apply to 
further offences,97 however there is no framework against which to assess 
whether CCINs should apply to a particular offence. In 2010, the NSW Law 
Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) recommended that guidelines should 
provide that penalty notices are suitable for minor offences (although the 
NSWLRC admitted that there was ‘no consistency in submissions as to what a 
definition of “minor offence” should be’).98 The NSWLRC recommended that 
CINs are not suitable for offences involving violence. 99 
 
1 Disorderly Behaviour 
 
The offence of disorderly behavior in s 74A of the Criminal Code comprises a 
number of discrete offences, including using insulting, offensive or threatening 
language and behaving in an insulting, offensive or threatening manner. The 
                                                
95 Department of Justice: Court and Tribunal Services, Infringement Notices 
<http://www.courts.dotag.wa.gov.au/I/infringement_notices.aspx?uid=4916-1423-2566-8813>; 
Criminal Code (Infringement Notices) Regulations 2015 (WA) sch 2. 
96 Peter Collier in contributing to the debate on the Bill, Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Council, 23 February 2011 911; WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 2, 45. 
97 See WA Ombudsman, above n 6. 
98 NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 49, 67. 
99 Ibid 69. 
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offence may target conduct ranging from swearing at police to urinating in 
public.100 Conduct is considered ‘disorderly’ if it: 
 
…is conduct which, while sufficiently ill-mannered, or in bad taste, to meet with 
the disapproval of well-conducted and reasonable men and women, is also 
something more—it must … tend to annoy or insult such persons as are faced with 
it—and sufficiently deeply or seriously to warrant the interference of the criminal 
law.101 
 
The crime of disorderly conduct has a location element, in that the behaviour 
must occur ‘in a public place’, ‘in the sight or hearing of any person who is in a 
public place’ or ‘in a police station or lock-up’. The maximum sentence that a 
court can impose for disorderly conduct is a fine of $6000. 
Given broad judicial definitions of ‘disorderliness’ and ‘offensiveness’, the 
discernment of disorderly conduct is highly subjective.102 Words are considered 
to be ‘offensive’ if they provoke in the reasonable person an emotional reaction 
such as anger, resentment, disgust or outrage in the context in which they are 
used.103 The WA Supreme Court has also held that language which challenges 
‘the authority of police officers’ is likely to be considered offensive and 
disorderly. 104  Relevantly, the ALRC in 2018 recommended that state and 
territory governments review provisions which criminalise offensive language 
with a view to repealing these provisions or narrowing their scope.105 This 
recommendation was made in light of the continued disproportionate use of 
offensive language and public nuisance charges against Indigenous 
Australians. 106  Police officers are regularly the ‘victims’ or addressees of 
behaviour characterised as disorderly, promoting a situation where the 
                                                
100 Criminal Code (WA) s 74(1); Each of these adjectives (offensive, insulting and so on) is not 
defined in statute, but has been considered in case law. See Methven, above n 39. 
101 Melser v Police [1967] NZLR 437, 444 (Turner J); quoted with approval in Heanes v Herangi 
(2007) 175 A Crim R 175 (Johnson J at 209). 
102 For discussion, see Luke McNamara and Julia Quilter, ‘Time to Define the Cornerstone of Public 
Order Legislation: The Elements of Offensive Conduct and Language under the Summary Offences 
Act 1988 (NSW)’ (2013) 36 University of New South Wales Law Journal 534; Elyse Methven, ‘“Weeds 
of Our Own Making”: Language Ideologies, Swearing and the Criminal Law’ (2016) 34(2) Law in 
Context 117. 
103 Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 25–6 (Gleeson CJ); Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 
175, [135]. 
104 Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175, [177]. 
105 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 50, Recommendation 12–4, 17 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/indigenous-incarceration-report133>. 
106 Ibid; see also Tamara Walsh, ‘Public Nuisance, Race and Gender’ (2017) 26(3) Griffith Law Review 
334. 
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investigator, enforcer and adjudicator of a CCIN may also be the alleged 
victim.107 Consequently, a level of bias and self-interest may operate in an 
officer’s determination of whether the conduct is disorderly.  
 
2 Stealing  
 
Under s 378 of the Criminal Code, a person who steals anything capable of 
being stolen is liable to imprisonment for up to seven years, although if the 
value does not exceed $1000, the person is liable to a summary conviction and a 
fine of up to $6000.108 As noted above, CCINs can only be issued where the 
value of the property is no greater than $500. Generally, a thing is considered 
capable of being stolen if it is inanimate, moveable ‘property’.109 Stealing is 
further defined as ‘fraudulently’110 taking anything capable of being stolen or 
converting property to one’s own use or the use of any other person, with an 
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. Despite being 
considered a ‘low-level’ offence where the value of the property stolen does not 
exceed $500, the criminal law elements of stealing are complex,111 a factor 
which would weigh against its inclusion within a CCIN regime where liability is 
determined expediently by police officers.  
The WA Ombudsman’s report found that the option to use CCINs for 
stealing resulted in net-widening, and that this had the starkest impact on 
Aboriginal female alleged offenders. The number of actions (including CCINs, 
arrests and summonses) taken for stealing in the monitoring period when 
compared to the number of actions (arrests and summonses) taken in the 
                                                
107 For example, a study conducted by the NSW Ombudsman found that, of those CINs issued for 
offensive language to Aboriginal people between 2002 and 2007, 70 per cent of the language used was 
directed at police only. Twenty three per cent of the language was directed at police and others: NSW 
Ombudsman, above n 65; See also Walsh, above n 106, in relation to the offence of public nuisance in 
Queensland. 
108 Criminal Code (WA) ss 378; 426(4). The section also contains aggravated offences with higher 
penalties depending on the nature of the item stolen (for example, the stealing of a testamentary 
instrument or an aircraft attracts a penalty of up to 10 years). 
109 The term ‘property’ is defined inclusively in s 371(7) and comprises any real and personal 
property, money, debts, bank credits, and legacies and all deeds and instruments relating to or 
evidencing the title or right to any property or giving a right to recover or receive any money or 
goods. Things considered capable of being stolen also include tame animals and wild animals kept in 
a state of confinement (such as a lion in a zoo), or dead bodies of animals; for a complete list, see s 
370. 
110 Criminal Code (WA) s 371(3) provides that the ‘taking or conversion may be fraudulent, although 
it is effected without secrecy or attempt at concealment’. 
111 See Ilich v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 110. 
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benchmarking period (the year before CCINs commenced operation) increased 
by 34% for Aboriginal female alleged offenders, and 18% for Aboriginal male 
alleged offenders.112 Exemplified by the case study examined at the outset of this 
article, in some of these instances, the $500 fine would have been 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offence committed. 
The Ombudsman offered a number of explanations for the large 
proportion of CCINs issued for the offence of stealing during the monitoring 
period. Notable among these is that where a CCIN is issued, police are able to 
return the property alleged to have been stolen to the apparent owner or 
possessor. In contrast, where a defendant is charged with stealing, the property 
owner may have to forfeit the property to police as ‘evidence’ to be presented in 
court. This distinction is likely to render CCINs a preferred option for the 
alleged victim, given that CCINS not only give the impression of ‘swift’ 
retribution, but also, the alleged victim avoids the time and effort associated 
with the investigatory process and giving evidence in court, and can have their 
property returned to them ‘on the spot’. These factors in turn provide an 
incentive for police to issue a CCIN as an alternative to a charge, summons or 
caution.113  
This Part has detailed the framework of the CCIN regime in WA, and 
considered its operation with respect to the crimes of stealing and disorderly 
behaviour in light of the WA Ombudsman’s findings. It has brought to the fore 
a number of concerns relating to the ‘swift justice’ delivered by CCINs, 
including increased arbitrariness; excessive police discretion; the reversal of the 
onus of proof; the imposition of disproportionate punishment; a lack of 
oversight and accountability; and the reproduction of inequalities. With these 
concerns in mind, Part IV evaluates how CCINs have been discursively 




                                                
112 The number of actions by police in response to incidents of stealing for Aboriginal male offenders 
increased by 18 per cent: WA Ombudsman, above n 6, vol 1, 39. 
113 Ibid vol 1, 40. 
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IV A DISCOURSE OF ECONOMISATION 
 
This is all about smarter and more effective law enforcement, ensuring that our 
police officers are on the beat fighting crime and our court system is working more 
efficiently.114 
 
A Cheap and Efficient Justice 
 
While criminal punishment has manifold aims, it is commonly recognised that 
punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the 
culpability of the offender, denounce the conduct, deter the offender and others 
from committing similar offences, rehabilitate the offender, account for any 
harm occasioned to the victim, and protect the community.115 The justifications 
provided for introducing CCINs in WA and the principles upon which they 
were based bear little resemblance to ordinary objectives of criminal 
punishment.116 When the Criminal Code Amendment (Infringement Notices) 
Bill 2010 (‘the Bill’) was first introduced in WA Parliament, then WA Minister 
for Police, Rob Johnson, touted CCINS as a ‘quick alternative to arrest’ which 
would reduce administrative demands, increase productivity and deliver cost-
savings.117 The Minister’s press release explained that CCINs would deliver 
                                                
114 Rob Johnson, ‘Police to give on-the-spot fines for minor crimes’ (Media Statement, 8 
September 2010) <https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/Barnett/2010/09/Police-
to-give-on-the-spot-fines-for-minor-crimes.aspx>. 
115 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; See Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 
CLR 465; Also of significance in the last three decades is the rise of ‘restorative justice’ measures. 
These measures emphasise reintegration, reparation, and mediation between offenders, victims, 
families, other affected parties and the wider community, and may include circle sentencing, 
reintegrative shaming, reconciliation, and new and emerging forms of conflict resolution. David 
Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of New South 
Wales (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 1228. 
116 A cursory reference was made to deterrence. The Minister for Police said in the Second Reading 
Speech to the Bill that CCINs would still ‘provid[e] an incentive for behaviour change’: Western 
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 September 2010 6138 
<http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/Hansard/hansard.nsf/0/9b4f1c5d51fc1370482577d8003006bb/$FI
LE/A38+S1+20100908+p6137d-6139a.pdf>. 
117 The Minister outlined that the ‘key objectives’ of the scheme would be: ‘to reduce the 
administrative demands on police in relation to relatively minor offences by providing a quick 
alternative to arrest …to reduce the time taken by police in preparation for and appearance at court; 
to allow police to remain on front-line duties rather than having to take the offender back to the 
police station; to provide an additional general tool in the array of responses available to police; to 
provide police with greater flexibility in their response to criminal behaviour; to … reduc[e] both 
court time and trial backlogs; and to provide a diversionary option for the community as a means of 
avoiding court appearances for minor offences’. Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 21 October 2010 6138–9. 
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‘smarter’ and ‘more effective’ law enforcement. Johnson stated that the regime 
‘will allow police to remain on frontline duties rather than having to go through 
a lengthy administrative process to bring an offender before the courts for 
relatively minor offences’; will save ‘the court system the cost of having to deal 
with relatively low-level crime’; and will ensure ‘that our police officers are on 
the beat fighting crime and our court system is working more efficiently.’118 
This emphasis on increasing efficiency, reducing paperwork and allowing 
police to remain on the streets was reflected in the language of the Opposition 
Labor Party and the National Party, which each supported the legislation.119 
This message was also reproduced a few days prior to the commencement of 
the pilot scheme on 25 March 2015, when then Police Minister Liza Harvey was 
questioned about the operation of CCINs. Harvey stated: ‘Police officers 
welcome this initiative. It will reduce red tape. It will take them from behind a 
desk and onto the front line. It will allow us to divert offenders from the 
criminal justice system and from the courts.’120  
There are some noteworthy features of the political discourse in relation to 
CCINs. Firstly, the politicians represent the capacity of CCINs to cut 
paperwork, save time and divert offenders away from the court system as 
categorical facts by repeatedly prefacing each proposition with the high 
modality phrase: ‘It will’. 121  This expresses the speaker’s certainty of, or 
categorical commitment to, CCINs achieving these objectives. Many of the 
politicians’ overwhelmingly positive statements about the diversionary and 
productive capacity of CCINs are framed as objective truths (as opposed to 
subjective opinions), without the politicians providing any evidence to ground 
                                                
118 Rob Johnson, Media Statement: Police to Give on-the-Spot Fines for Minor Crimes (8 September 
2010) Parliament of WA <https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/Barnett/2010/09/Police-to-
give-on-the-spot-fines-for-minor-crimes.aspx>. 
119 Kate Doust (Labor, Opposition), in her contribution to the debate on the Bill, stated: ‘I imagine it 
will make the lives of police on the street a lot easier, particularly given that they will have the 
discretion to issue these notices. I imagine that it will save them a lot of paperwork, which will 
ultimately free them up to have a greater presence on the streets, and I think that is something we all 
want to see’ Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 22 February 2011 782. 
The Greens Party also supported the Bill, Giz Watson (Greens) stated in the debate on the Bill: ‘we do 
in principle support the bill, but we want to ensure that the scheme is evaluated properly and in its 
entirety, and successfully moved an amendment that the Ombudsman keep under scrutiny the 
operation of its provisions, with particular regard to the impact of their operation on Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities’. As did the National Party - see contribution to the debate of 
Philip Gardiner (Nationals) Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 
February 2011 910–11, 915–6. 
120 (Liza Harvey, Police Minister), Questions: Criminal Code Infringement Notices, Western 
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 25 March 2015 2169b-2169b. 
121 See Fairclough, above n 20, 147. 
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their assertions. Further examples include Johnson’s claim that: ‘These [CCINs] 
will allow police to remain on frontline duties rather than having to go through 
a lengthy administrative process’, as well as then President of the WA Law 
Society, Hylton Quail’s statement that ‘there'll be reduced backlog in the courts’ 
and ‘that'll also liberate resourcing in policing’.122 Each of these statements 
presents the idea that CCINs will benefit the criminal justice system as a 
universal truth without qualification.  
Another noteworthy feature of the political rhetoric in relation to CCINs is 
the politicians’ reduction of complex processes into simple nouns, pronouns 
and metaphors.123 Consider Harvey’s statement: ‘It will reduce red tape.’ In this 
concise sentence, the pronoun ‘It’ replaces the CCIN scheme introduced by the 
Bill. This abstraction misrepresents the truth, for the legislation which 
introduced the scheme cannot, on its own, ‘reduce red tape’. Whether CCINs 
will perform their stated objectives will depend on how often police officers 
issue CCINs in circumstances where they would otherwise have charged the 
recipient, and how often CCIN recipients pay their fine on-time rather than 
‘court-elect’ or are subject to fine enforcement measures. In this way, the 
political rhetoric oversimplifies the productive and diversionary capacity of the 
legislation, and masks the variables (such as police exercise of discretion) upon 
which the Bill’s ability to reduce red tape depends. 
 
B Reducing Red Tape 
 
Another transformation within the sentence ‘It will reduce red tape’ is the 
replacement of a variety of actions with the metaphor ‘red tape’. Red tape serves 
as a symbol for all manner of ills associated with an ‘overly constrictive 
bureaucracy’; 124  red tape could allude to unnecessary or meaningless 
paperwork; too many formal processes or constraints; unnecessary or overly-
                                                
122 Police to Issue On-the-Spot Fines for Disorderly Conduct (8 September 2010) ABC News 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-09-08/police-to-issue-on-the-spot-fines-for-disorderly/2252724>. 
Then Minister for Energy, Peter Collier, similarly represented the positive contribution that CCINs 
will make by the use of high modality phrases: ‘… it is an eminently sensible bill. It will free up time 
for police to do their work in other areas. It will reduce the administrative demands on police. It will 
reduce the time taken by police for court appearances and it will save court time, amongst a number 
of other advantages’: Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 February 
2011. 
123 For discussion of transformations see Roger Fowler and Gunther Kress, ‘Critical Linguistics’ in 
Roger Fowler et al (eds), Language and Control (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979) 185, 207–8. 
124 Li Lan and Lucy MacGregor, ‘Colour Metaphors in Business Discourse’ [2009] Language for 
professional communication: Research, practice and training 11, 19–20. 
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restrictive rules, procedures and regulations; or unjustifiable delays. 125  Of 
course, red tape is not actually being reduced by the Bill in a physical sense.126 
Instead, metaphors structure our experience of one thing in terms of another, 
and are an important ideological means by which to (re)construct reality.127  
Harvey’s use of the phrase ‘red tape’ with reference to CCINs must be 
viewed in the broader context of her, and her political party’s, neoliberal agenda 
to reduce forms of government regulation and oversight. Harvey cited CCINs 
as an example of the WA government’s ‘red tape reduction initiatives’ 
introduced in 2015.128 The Bill can be viewed as part of a broader package of 
WA government initiatives, including a ‘Red Tape Reduction Report card’, calls 
for the public to submit ideas to Treasury to #ShredTheRed and a ‘Red Tape 
Rapid Assessment Tool’ to identify areas in which red tape could be reduced by 
Government.129 In her inaugural speech in 2008, Harvey argued: ‘We must 
reduce bureaucratic interference and needless compliance. Government needs 
to keep its nose out of the business of small business, thereby encouraging 
prosperity in their enterprises’.130 While initially as Minister for Small Business, 
Harvey’s red-tape-cutting agenda was concentrated on business and 
consumers, in 2015 as Police Minister, this focus was expanded to include 
reducing ‘bureaucratic interference’ in criminal justice measures, such as 
allowing suspects to be kept in custody without being personally guarded by a 
                                                
125 Barry Bozeman, ‘A Theory of Government “Red Tape”’ (1993) 3(3) Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 273, 274. 
126 SIL, Glossary of Linguistic Terms <http://www.glossary.sil.org/term/ontological-metaphor>. 
127 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 
2003). 
128 Government of Western Australia, ‘Police Back on the Beat after Red Tape Slashed’ (Media 
Statement, 18 November 2015) 
<https://www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/Pages/Barnett/2015/11/Police-back-on-the-beat-after-red-
tape-slashed.aspx>. 
129 Western Australia Department of Treasury, Red Tape Rapid Assessment Tool 
<http://www.treasury.wa.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Site-
content/Economic_Reform/Reducing_Red_Tape/Red-Tape-Rapid-Assessment-Tool.pdf.>; Parallels 
can be drawn to the Commonwealth Liberal/National Party’s annual ‘red tape repeal day’, which 
commenced in 2014, when the Australian Government under then Prime Minister Tony Abbott 
announced plans to ‘cut $1 billion in red tape every year’: Australian Government Department of Jobs 
and Small Business, Deregulation Agenda | Department of Jobs and Small Business, Australian 
Government (9 March 2018) Department of Jobs and Small Business 
<https://www.jobs.gov.au/deregulation-agenda>. 
130 Western Australia, Inaugural Speech: Mrs Liza Harvey, Legislative Assembly, 25 November 2008 
<http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/parliament/Memblist.nsf/(MemberPics)/F47B019922A3A598C82
574D0001EBED1/$file/Inaug+Harvey+final.pdf>. 
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police officer, and—relevant to this article—introducing CCINs.131 By tracing 
the increasing application of the phrase red tape and its associated goals of cost-
cutting and reduced paperwork to criminal justice policies, we see how business 
and market-oriented values colonise parts of the public sphere ‘traditionally 
governed by nonmarket norms’.132  
In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson observed that once 
metaphors are naturalised into our understanding of reality, they can guide 
appropriate future actions that ‘fit the metaphor’, becoming ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecies’.133 If red tape is conceived of in negative terms as unnecessarily 
burdensome, the obvious solution is to cut or eliminate it, hence its correlation 
with the verb ‘reduce’ in the sentence: ‘It will reduce red tape’.134 Lakoff and 
Johnson also remind us that metaphors provide only partial and not total 
understandings of concepts; for if metaphors were total, that concept would 
actually be the other, rather than be understood in terms of the other concept. 
As metaphors provide partial understandings of concepts, they also obscure or 
downplay other aspects of concepts.135 And the understandings that metaphors 
create can be resisted by substituting new metaphors or symbols for old ones. 
In Harvey’s sentence: ‘It will reduce red tape’, the processes that the 
metaphor ‘red tape’ replaces—investigating and prosecuting crime, taking a 
suspect back to a police station to be charged and fingerprinted, interviewing 
suspects, drafting up witness statements, proving a crime beyond reasonable 
doubt, providing reasons for decisions, and adducing fair and admissible 
evidence in court—do not have to (and it is argued, should not) be conceived of 
in negative terms. In addition, Harvey’s lexical choice to replace such processes 
with the metaphor red tape was not inevitable; she could have chosen to spell 
out the processes which she replaced, or alternatively, used phrases with more 
                                                
131 As then Finance Minister Bill Marmion stated: ‘By cutting red tape, WA Police have been able to 
reduce the administrative burden on their officers and ensure they are on the beat responding to 
crime, providing a more efficient service to the community’: Government of Western Australia, above 
n 128. 
132 Sandel, above n 19, 7. 
133 Lakoff and Johnson, above n 127, 156. 
134 See also then NSW Attorney-General Bob Debus comment on CINs in NSW: ‘I am told by my 
colleague the Minister for Police that he has visited dozens of police stations during his time in office, 
and he has been told on dozens of occasions not only that officers would like to be less involved with 
paperwork and red tape but also that officers have consistently supported a scheme of this nature is a 
way of cutting down on paperwork’: NSW Ombudsman, ‘Put on the Spot - Criminal Infringement 
Notices Trial’ (Discussion Paper, NSW Ombudsman, August 2003), 6 
<https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/3484/Put-on-the-Spot-Criminal-
Infringement-Notices-Trial-Discussion-paper-August-2003.pdf>. 
135 Lakoff and Johnson, above n 127, 12–13. 
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positive connotations, such as ‘procedural justice’136 or ‘procedural safeguards’. 
From a different ideological standpoint—one concerned less with reducing 
government ‘interference’ and increasing ‘efficiency’—the processes that 
Harvey replaced with the phrase red tape would be correlated with positive 
values such as increasing fairness, oversight and accountability, and reducing 
the risk of bias and prejudice. As Kaufman has observed: ‘one person’s “red 
tape” may be another’s treasured safeguard’.137 However the business-focused, 
anti-bureaucratic discourse which characterised the introductions of CCINs 
meant that questions of procedural fairness were framed as impediments to 
efficiency and productivity.  
 
C The Vocabulary of Business and Economics 
 
The lexis in parliamentary debates, press releases and police websites in relation 
to CCINs, as well as the Ombudsman’s evaluation of the scheme, is replete with 
near-synonymous words, ordinarily associated with the fields of business and 
economics. In the texts analysed, terms and phrases such as ‘red tape’, being 
‘behind a desk’, ‘paperwork’, ‘in-house office work’, ‘administrative demands’, 
‘court time’ and offenders being dealt with in ‘the criminal justice system’ are 
framed in negative terms, and collocated with verbs such as reduce, free up, 
save, cut, slash and divert. Meanwhile, terms such as ‘efficiency’, ‘flexibility’, 
‘economic benefits’ and ‘productivity’ are positively appraised, and collocated 
with verbs such as increase, provide and improve.  
Much of this vocabulary evokes the NewLiberalSpeak described by 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, and shows an ‘intense preoccupation’ 138  of the 
speakers with a narrow set of free market values. Like the phrase ‘red tape’, 
many of these words such as ‘efficiency’, ‘productivity’, ‘administrative 
demands’ and ‘paperwork’ are examples of abstractions in that they abstract 
away from more specific micro-actions. Being abstract in form, each of these 
terms could be infused with a number of different interpretations, depending 
on the textual context in which they are used, and the ideological position and 
background of the audience infusing the terms with meaning. For example, 
‘efficiency’ in the context of criminal justice to some might necessitate each 
                                                
136 See Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer Science & 
Business Media, 1988). 
137 Herbert Kaufman, Red Tape: Its Origins, Uses, and Abuses (Brookings Institution Press, 2015) 1. 
138 Fowler and Kress, above n 123, 211–12. 
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police officer imposing the highest number of fines in the least amount of time 
(which may or may not have regard to culpability) to achieve maximum profit 
to the State. To others, efficiency might involve only imposing fines on those 
who have the means to pay them, or only issuing CCINs where they might 
produce a diversionary effect.139 An imprecise measure of success when applied 
to the criminal justice system, the term ‘efficiency’ is apt to be misused and 
abused depending on the motivations of the person using it.  
 
D Out of the Office and On the Beat 
 
An additional preoccupation discerned from the parliamentary debates and 
media statements is that of ‘frontline policing’. The politicians commonly 
express that the best—and sometimes the only—place for police to be is ‘on the 
streets’, ‘out amongst the public or on the road’, ‘on the beat’, ‘outside the 
office’, doing ‘frontline duties’ or ‘on the front line’.140 By contrast, police 
should not be ‘typing’ ‘in-house’, ‘behind a desk’ and doing ‘paperwork’.141 This 
notion that police belong on the streets is encapsulated in the following excerpt 
from the speech of then Minister for Agriculture and National Party member, 
Philip Gardner, regarding the Bill:  
 
[T]he best place for the police is, mostly, out amongst the public or on the roads 
… They play a valuable role in ensuring that those of us who are tempted or 
pressured to break the law in minor ways hold to the law. Therefore, anything 
that reduces police paperwork is a good thing. Those of us who have been in 
police offices must be appalled at how much typing and in-house office work the 
police are meant to do. Coming from an agricultural background, I can say that 
the more time spent in the office, the less time spent where the work that needs to 
                                                
139 Of course, these are just a couple of the multiple meanings which can be ascribed to this abstract 
word in the context of CCINs and the criminal justice system. 
140 Kate Doust, Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 22 February 2011 
781b-787a; Peter Collier; Phillip Gardiner Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Council, 23 February 2011 900c-916a; Government of Western Australia, above n 129; Western 
Australia Police, Criminal Code Infringement Notices Western Australia Police 
<https://www.police.wa.gov.au/About-Us/News/Criminal-Code-Infringement-Notices>; Western 
Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 October 2010; Western Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 9 November 2010. 
141 Kate Doust, Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 22 February 2011 
781b-787a; Phillip Gardiner Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 
February 2011 909c-916a; Liza Harvey (Police Minister) Questions: Criminal Code Infringement 
Notices Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 25 March 2015 2169b-
2169b. 
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be done is, because the season is always pressing for the work out in the paddock 
to be done. In my view, the same principles apply to the police function.  
 
In this excerpt, Gardiner draws similarities between the occupations of policing 
and farming. If one were to unpack this analogy, it could be argued that a police 
officer’s primary responsibilities: to detect crime, enforce the law and protect 
the community, bear little resemblance to those of the average Western 
Australian farmer: sowing seeds, planting crops or raising animals for human 
consumption to make a profit. This analogy, and the consistent pairing in 
parliamentary debates of ‘police’ with places such as ‘on the front line’ and ‘on 
the beat’, promote a dichotomous ordering of the environment in which police 
belong outside, or are ‘in place’142 on the street, but are ‘out of place’ inside a 
courtroom or an office. With repetition, the notion that police belong on the 
street assumes the character of ‘orthodoxy’, a taken-for-granted truth or ‘law 
and order commonsense’.143 Not one politician in the parliamentary debates in 
relation to the Bill interrupted or challenged this orthodoxy by proposing the 
heretical view that time spent indoors typing, documenting interactions and 





This article has demonstrated how CCINs have been legitimised as a necessary 
criminal justice measure in WA using neoliberal economic reasoning. Drawing 
on CDA, the author has demonstrated how market values have been applied to 
criminal law and procedure, displacing the application of criminal justice 
policies that incorporate due process, transparency and accountability. In 
                                                
142 See Tim Cresswell, In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996); Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution 
and Taboo (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966). 
143 See Hogg and Brown, above n 38. 
144 Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Kate Doust, stated: ‘The application of this set of arrangements 
is probably commonsense; I imagine it will make the lives of police on the street a lot easier, 
particularly given that they will have the discretion to issue these notices. I imagine that it will save 
them a lot of paperwork, which will ultimately free them up to have a greater presence on the streets, 
and I think that is something we all want to see’. Member for the Greens Party, Giz Watson, voiced 
concerns about the potential disproportionate impact of CCINs on Indigenous communities, but 
stated that ‘we [the Greens] do in principle support the bill, but we want to ensure that the scheme is 
evaluated properly and in its entirety’. Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 
22 February 2011 781b-787a. 
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addition, from the discourse examined, it is clear that policy-makers and 
evaluators have privileged the ‘engine of economic activity’145 over traditional 
criminal punishment objectives relating to proportionate punishment, 
deterrence, denunciation of the conduct, rehabilitation, protection of the 
community, and recognition of the harm done to the victim and the 
community. 
A key problem with evaluating criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions in 
terms of economic objectives is that in doing so other priorities, particularly 
those concerned with morality, culpability and justice, are overshadowed. 
Language associated with the domains of business and free-market capitalism is 
particularly adept at stifling moral and ethical values, especially when the 
primary imperative of business is to increase its profits or maximise 
shareholder value.146 As John Lanchester has argued: ‘The language of money 
doesn’t express any implied moral perspective: Judgements of right and wrong 
are left out.’147 An alternative proposition, and one that this author finds even 
more convincing, is that the language of money does profess a moral judgment, 
a morality which prioritises profit over all other goals.  
Neoliberal goals of maximising productivity and profit, while reducing 
government expenditure and oversight, can distract us from the central 
question of whether administrative fines for criminal offences are capable of 
delivering justice. To this end, the author suggests that the following justice-
related factors, raised in the analysis above, should replace (or at least be ranked 
before) neoliberal concerns if we are to properly evaluate the operation and 
legitimacy of CINs schemes: 
• the lack of evidence linking CINs to sentencing objectives such as 
community safety, denunciation, deterrence and rehabilitation; 
• police officers issuing CINs perform the (often conflicting) roles of 
investigator, enforcer, judge and sometimes also the alleged victim;  
• CINs displace the criminal burden and standard of proof, police need 
not provide reasons for their decision to issue a CIN and there is little 
oversight of this decision;  
                                                
145 Bourdieu and Wacquant, above n 15, 3. 
146 Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits’ The New York 
Times Magazine (New York), 13 September 1970; Frank Stilwell, Oh, the Morality: Why Ethics 
Matters in Economics The Conversation <http://theconversation.com/oh-the-morality-why-ethics-
matters-in-economics-5963>. 
147 John Lanchester, How to Speak Money (Faber and Faber, 2014) 16. 
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• the fixed penalty imposed by a CIN may be disproportionate to—and 
fail to account for—the culpability and financial means of the 
offender;  
• police may be motivated to issue CINs by reasons other than the 
culpability of the offender or their capacity to deter further offending 
(such as cost-savings, time-savings or returning property back to the 
victim);148  
• many recipients have not challenged their CINs in circumstances 
where they may have escaped criminal sanction; 
• CINs have been disproportionately used against those who are 
financially disadvantaged, homeless, have a mental illness or disability, 
and/or are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander. 
These factors taken together not only operate as a barrier to any further 
implementation of CINs schemes; they also provide a strong foundation for an 
argument that Parliaments should reconsider their use in the context of minor 
and public order offences, at least until issues such as unequal application, lack 
of transparency and judicial oversight, and disproportionate punishment are 
adequately addressed. The focus of lawmakers, and those evaluating CINs, must 
shift to whether CINs adequately incorporate these criminal justice safeguards.  
This argument is made with knowledge of the likelihood that CINs will 
apply to an increasing number of offences in the near future. On this issue, the 
WA Ombudsman in 2017 recommended that CCINs be used ‘for a range of 
other appropriate offences subject to consideration of the findings and 
recommendations in this report regarding the impact on Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders and vulnerable communities.’149 This recommendation was 
made with the objective of maximising profit and increasing productivity, being 
largely based on the Ombudsman’s assessment that broadening the CCIN 
scheme will result in an ‘economic benefit’. The NSW Police have similarly 
foreshadowed an expanding use of CINs in that state. The NSW Police Force’s 
Corporate Plan for the years 2016-2018 lists as one of its priorities: ‘Maximise 
use of available court alternatives for minor offences’. The strategy that the 
NSW Police will implement to achieve this is to: ‘Explore legislative 
                                                
148 This is not to say that the return of property to the victim, and the victim’s experience in the 
criminal justice system, should not be improved where possible; rather, it is to say that the immediate 
return of property to the alleged victim should not trump the proper investigation of criminal 
offences and the evaluation of the most appropriate action to be taken for the alleged offence by the 
police officer.  
149 WA Ombudsman, above n 6, Recommendation 11, vol 1, 56. 
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amendment to expand the use of criminal infringement notices’. Incredibly, in 
light of the many variables upon which criminal offending numbers depend, 
the Corporate Plan lists as an ‘indicator of success’ the NSW Police Force 
achieving a target of greater than or equal to 11,300 CINs.150 
There is a need to question the consequences of expanding the application 
of on-the-spot fines to minor offences, and alongside this, to resist the intrusion 
of a neoliberal discourse into the domain of criminal justice. This is not to say 
that questions of cost and efficiency should not be considered in criminal 
justice policy reform. Instead, market values should not be the dominant 
paradigm according to which (quasi-) criminal sanctions are measured. By 
implementing criminal justice reform based on neoliberal economic values, we 
risk displacing the safeguards ordinarily attached to the criminal justice system. 
                                                
150 NSW Police Force, Corporate Plan 2016-2018 
<https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/publications/publications/corporate_plan>. 
